{"id":16555,"date":"2023-03-03T13:59:35","date_gmt":"2023-03-03T12:59:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/banquerichelieumonaco.com\/?p=16555"},"modified":"2023-03-03T14:03:11","modified_gmt":"2023-03-03T13:03:11","slug":"monthly-review-march-2023","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/banquerichelieumonaco.com\/en\/2023\/03\/03\/monthly-review-march-2023\/","title":{"rendered":"Monthly Review – March 2023"},"content":{"rendered":"\n
By Alexandre Hezez<\/strong>, Group Strategist<\/p>\n\n\n\n Being late in the normalization of interest rates, central banks had to and were able to accelerate the pace at an historical level. Starting the end of 2021 and for months, the Federal Reserve constantly repeated that the price increase was transitory, partly due to supply issues and components shortages. Then, Jerome Powell estimated before the Senate Banking Committee that “ the time has probably come to stop using the word transitional<\/em> <\/strong> “and that ” the risks of more persistent inflation have increased “.<\/em> This was in contrast to the official position of his European counterpart. However, the war in Ukraine has changed this fragile situation and maintained a movement that was already well established.<\/p>\n\n\n Western central banks lagged behind in the face of rising prices, but they quickly became real inflation fighters, as evidenced by the overall interventions. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The purpose of a central bank is to maintain the economic and financial stability of the country by controlling the money supply and influencing interest rates.<\/strong> The initial causes of the return of inflation are well known. They have emerged post-pandemic with the disruption of supply chains and investment plans promoting environmental transition. Then, the war in Ukraine disrupted the balance of commodity prices, especially energy prices. This chain of events then indirectly affected the prices of manufactured goods and services, making inflation a broader and potentially persistent problem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Paradoxically, for almost 10 years, monetary policies were focused on fighting the risk of deflation, sovereign risk and the proper transmission of the banking system to the economy.<\/strong> However, now that inflation has become a major concern, central banks are returning to their original mandate : to fight against inflation and to maintain economic stability.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Managing inflation expectations has become paramount to the detriment of steering monetary aggregates. These expectations, issued by the financial markets or economic actors, are crucial to guide decisions on prices and wages in the future, and thus determine the level of interest rates. The credibility of central banks is thus fundamental. This must be reflected in their communication as well as in their actions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Their independence, unwavering determination and ability to act to bring inflation down to 2% are many of the variables in the equation. Credibility requires strong rhetoric and adequate communication to avoid over-interpretation by markets that would counteract the effects of monetary policy. Indeed, let’s take the case where inflation starts to fall and communication becomes more accommodating. Such a scenario would fuel expectations of monetary loosening and improved credit conditions<\/strong>… The latter would again become inflationary and provoke a deeper crisis requiring more brutal action to contain it. <\/p>\n\n\n\n The essential tool, the “forward guidance”<\/em> , used by central banks, was already abandoned last year in view of the uncertain context. We are navigating in the mirror situation, where the monetary authorities have to create uncertainty to avoid any anticipation and prognosis from the markets and maintain a risk premium over time. The balance is precarious: avoiding excessive volatility or even a crisis and stemming any hard-to-manage recovery in inflation. In short, the low visibility granted by central banks must be compensated by firm and transparent communication.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Keeping medium-term inflation expectations anchored near the inflation target remains crucial to avoid any self-fulfilling change in economic agents.<\/strong> For now, the battle is won but the fight is far from over. <\/p>\n\n\n Are central banks looking for a recession ? <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In August 2022, Jerome Powell’s speech at the Jackson Hole central bankers’ conference emphasized his frank intention to use ” vigorously all its tools ” and ” a long period of lower growth “<\/em> thus ” that a slowdown in the labor market ” before concluding ” the fight against inflation in the United States will hurt U.S. households and businesses but giving it up would be even more damaging to the economy “.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The stated objective for the coming months is to prevent demand from accelerating faster than supply<\/strong>. So once again, we have to restrict the financing conditions. Disinflation will be long and laborious. Of course, we already have inflection points, but they are still very far from the desired standards. <\/p>\n\n\n\n Recent figures in the United States and Europe suggest a more complex situation. Financial conditions have largely eased and consumption remains strong (linked to a very robust labor market and the use of Covid savings). The Fed was faced with a nasty surprise regarding inflation with the release of the PCE data that far exceeded expectations to the upside<\/strong>. After several months of slowdown, inflationary pressures picked up again in January, both in annual and monthly variation, for total inflation (+5.4% year-on-year vs. +5.3% in December) and core inflation (+4.7% vs. +4.6%). This revision, significantly higher than historical, also raised concerns, confirming that the Fed still has a lot of work to do. FED members are now facing increasing pressure as the PCE index is their preferred indicator for inflation analysis. The central bank will focus on the services component excluding housing, which continues to accelerate strongly in January as business leaders pass on past wage increases to prices<\/strong> (this is even the third month of acceleration). The risks of second-round effects are materializing, which is the main point of vigilance when the next indicators are published and the March 22 meeting is held. Some members spoke out after the inflation numbers were released, talking about the need to raise rates several times, without committing to a clear terminal rate, or the need to go back to 50 bp steps.<\/p>\n\n\n Despite the strength of inflation, the loss of household purchasing power remains moderate and households continue to consume<\/strong>, as evidenced by the increase in January in consumer spending in value and volume terms, while the savings rate has risen slightly. The slowdown in prices and growth expected by the Fed remains far too moderate to allow it to consider the end of monetary tightening, which leads us to revise upwards our key rate and short rate targets. We remain cautious about the terminal rate level that will need to be achieved<\/strong> (financial investors’ expectations are now at 5.4% according to future curves), even if we should not underestimate the future spread of the effects of the extent of the monetary tightening that has already taken place, particularly in real estate.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In Europe, with a bit of a delay, the situation is similar. The inflation rate in the Eurozone has fallen, with the consumer price index at 8.6% in January from its peak of 10.6% in October. However, core inflation, which excludes changes in energy and food prices, continues to rise and reached a record high of 5.3 percent in January. The markets, fearing persistent inflation, have revised upwards the expected levels of terminal policy rates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The markets were expecting a rapid cut in Fed policy rates as early as the second half of the year, but that prospect has been pushed back to 2024. As a result, policy rates will remain higher for an extended period. <\/p>\n\n\n\n What can central banks be afraid of?<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Like Ben Bernanke, chairman of the FED from 2006 to 2014, who constantly referred to the Japanese deflation of the 1990s, Jerome Powell bases his analysis on the last stagflation episode of the 1970s. According to him, the mistake the FED made in the 1970s was to fear plunging the economy into a sharp recession and then quickly lowering interest rates. Jerome Powell prefers to be considered as a second Paul Volcker rather than a second Arthur Burns<\/strong> (Fed Chairman from 1970 to 1978). It was not until 1975, far too late, that Burns admitted that the United States had an inflation problem. The lesson of this whole episode is painful: it is very dangerous to ignore transitory factors. At the time, when Carter appointed Volcker as head of the Fed in July 1979, he decided to reverse U.S. monetary policy. So the question is whether Jerome Powell has an unlimited capacity to normalize the situation. The United States experienced high inflation in the 1970s and into the early 1980s.<\/p>\n\n\nEditorial<\/strong><\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Sources : Bloomberg, Richelieu Group<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n
Sources: Bloomberg, Richelieu Group <\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n
<\/strong>Source : Twitter @NickTimiraos<\/em><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<\/div>\n\n\n